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This paper reviews the purpose and potential of commodity exchanges in Africa. Drawing from the 
existing literature and using indicative empirics, it examines the conditions that enable successful 
exchanges, highlights the special challenges to setting up exchanges in Africa, and reviews alternatives to 
domestic exchanges. We argue that many critical preconditions for the successful establishment of 
commodity exchanges in Africa remain binding in the short to medium term. The development of 
commodity exchanges in the region is impeded by the relatively small size of domestic commodity 
markets, the weak physical and communication infrastructure, a lack of supportive legal and regulatory 
environments, and the likelihood of policy interventions, particularly in the staple cereals market. 
Meanwhile, the demand for a domestic commodity exchange for export crops may be limited due to the 
availability of well-established exchanges abroad and functioning auction floors. The paper highlights 
three points: (a) efforts to launch exchanges in Africa should realistically assess whether basic conditions 
for success can be met, (b) if the pre-conditions cannot be met, the use of existing exchanges abroad or 
the development of regional exchanges may be more feasible than the establishment of national 
commodity exchanges, and (c) the goals of risk management and reduced transaction costs might be 
achieved more effectively by improving market fundamentals through investments in transportation, 
information services, or other financial institutions.  




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Organized commodity exchanges have a long history. Grain traders in Japan began experimenting 
with the idea in 1730, and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the London Metal Exchange 
successfully launched their operations in 1864 and 1877, respectively. For more than a century, 
commodity exchanges remained largely confined to industrialized nations, but with market 
liberalization and increasingly affordable information technology, they mushroomed around the world 
after 1990.
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Growing interest in commodity exchanges on the part of governments, donors, and the private 
sector in developing countries reflect a drive to reduce transactions costs and a need for new 
commodity risk management tools. Improvements in the institutions serving commodity markets are 
especially important to African countries that remain heavily dependent on a small range of 
commodities for export revenues (see Table 1). Because international markets are volatile and 
domestic markets are thin and fragmented, risk management is critical for commodity-sector 
development in Africa. With the dismantling or weakening of marketing boards and the unsatisfactory 
performance of international commodity agreements (ICAs), governments and their development 
partners have increasingly looked to commodity exchanges as a means of managing risk in a 
liberalized market environment.  
  By 2005, non-OECD countries accounted for more than 50 percent of the agricultural 
futures and options traded in the world.  The majority of the world’s functional commodity exchanges 
are now located outside of North America and Europe (UNCTAD 2007).  
While many of the commodity exchanges introduced in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s 
seem to have taken root, the record in Africa is less encouraging. Five African countries launched 
agricultural commodity exchanges following market liberalization in the 1990s, but only South Africa 
succeeded in making its exchange sustainable. Despite initial signs of success, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
suspended their operations following unusual price hikes and subsequent government intervention. 
Although they continue to exist with donor and government support, the Kenyan Agricultural 
Commodity Exchange (KACE) and the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UCE), both launched in the 
late 1990s, have never been able to attract sizable trade volumes. Currently, their limited roles include 
providing price information in Kenya and regulating some warehouses on behalf of the government in 
Uganda. 
Since 2004, more and more countries have launched exchanges. Notable examples include the 
African Commodity Exchange (ACE) in Malawi established in 2004, Nigeria’s exchange established 
in 2006, a new Zambian exchange (ZAMACE) established in 2007, and the much-publicized 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) established in 2008. The role of ACE has so far been limited 
to providing price information and facilitating procurement for the World Food Program, while the 
Abuja Securities and Commodity Exchange (ASCE) began trading in maize and soybeans in 2006 on 
a very limited scale. The ECX, a government-owned exchange, initially focused on trading maize, 
wheat, and beans, but was unable to attract a significant volume of these commodities. Since 
December 2008, the ECX has turned its focus to export commodities, with the support of policies 
discouraging export through other arrangements.  
Because commodity production and trade are the primary means of livelihood for millions of 
households, commodity sector development is essential for poverty alleviation and overall economic 
development. Faced with both price volatility and high marketing costs, many see commodity 
exchanges as an alternative way to manage risks and increase efficiency in a liberalized market 
environment (Gilbert 1996; Morgan 2001; Thurow and Kilman 2009). Despite the appeal of 
                                                       
1 India and Argentina had early initiatives. In India, the government initially intervened to prevent speculation after the 
country’s independence and eventually banned commodity exchanges in the mid-1950s. Argentina’s La Bolsa de Comercio 
de Rosario was formed in 1884, and its Mercado Término de Buenos Aires was established in 1907. Despite periods of 
difficulty, these exchanges continue to operate and have been linked with established exchanges in industrialized countries.  
2 
exchanges, however, the specific conditions needed for commodity exchanges to thrive in Africa seem 
to be poorly understood in the development and policy communities. This paper undertakes three 
tasks: (a) a review of the purposes of agricultural commodity exchanges in an African context, (b) an 
assessment of the conditions that can make commodity exchange viable, and (c) an investigation of 
alternatives to domestic commodity exchanges when conditions indicate such exchanges may not be 
viable. Section 2 describes the purpose of commodity exchange, while Section 3 contains an 
assessment of the preconditions for establishing a successful exchange. Section 4 examines the 
alternatives to domestic exchanges, and the paper concludes with a summary and policy implications.   
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2.  THE PURPOSE OF COMMODITY EXCHANGES 
The purposes served by a commodities exchange depend in part on the nature of the specific contracts 
that are traded.  By simply centralizing trade in a certain commodity, an exchange can facilitate title 
transfer, market transparency, and price discovery. Transaction costs are reduced because coordination 
through a centralized exchange can reduce costs associated with identifying market outlets, physically 
inspecting product quality, and finding buyers or sellers.  
By reducing transactions costs and enhancing the flow of information, an exchange can 
improve returns to market agents while reducing short-term price variability and spatial price 
dispersion. Such contracts offer little capacity to address inter-annual price uncertainty, but more 
sophisticated contracts allowing exchange in futures can enable further risk management. Such futures 
contracts, however, require a highly developed institution and cannot maintain spot within desired 
bounds. 
It is possible to organize an exchange around an auction floor in which physical goods are 
traded. In Africa, many such auction floors dealing in export commodities have operated for many 
decades. These auctions floors lower search costs for participants and may reduce market thinness and 
consequent price volatility, but they also impose costs for transportation and warehousing and offer 
little or no services for price risk management or financing. Recent efforts by developing commodity 
exchanges have attempted to move beyond auction floors to trade in fungible contracts that can be 
used as price-hedging devices. 
The simplest contract that can be traded is probably a warehouse receipt. Trade in warehouse 
receipts implies immediate title transfer for a specific quality and quantity of a commodity at a 
location specified on the receipt. While exchange in warehouse receipts can lower transfer costs in a 
marketing system and may facilitate financial transactions, it does little to help agents manage risk 
based on price variability that is rooted in the fundamentals of supply and demand. By contrast, by 
trading contracts for future delivery, commodity exchanges can help strengthen market liquidity, 
improve price discovery, and facilitate price risk management (Leuthold et al. 1989). An exchange can 
improve liquidity because a futures contract is a fungible financial instrument which buyers and sellers 
are willing to hold and exchange. While futures contracts effectively remove price level risk, they do 
not eliminate risk altogether. Rather, they replace price risk with basis risk, where the basis is the 
difference between the spot market and futures market prices. Unanticipated shifts in the basis can 
result in gains or losses, and the degree of basis risk can strongly influence the effectiveness of the 
exchange in risk management.  
Providing the services of a commodity exchange is expensive. The costs include physical 
investments in operational space, warehousing, and communications, as well as the operational costs 
involved in screening participants and enforcing contracts. Moreover, an exchange typically must 
provide clearinghouse services which allow for the buying and selling of the commodities traded at the 
stated prices with limited fear of default for participants. These services expose the exchange to both 
working capital costs and risk. For an exchange to succeed independently, its services must be 
sufficiently valued by users so that they are willing to pay fees to cover these costs. 
Futures markets historically evolved through private sector initiatives to address the 
deficiencies and high costs in spot markets. This raises an important question: if moving from spot 
markets to centralized commodity exchanges leads to economic improvement, why haven’t 
commodity futures exchanges emerged universally?  In some countries, government intervention has 
stifled commodity exchanges, but in other cases, exchanges fail to emerge because local conditions do 
not make their activities privately profitable. Market failures, including inadequacies in physical 
infrastructure, asymmetry in information, and inadequate legal and financial institutions, can all 
impede the formation of futures exchanges. From an institutional perspective, evolution of a system of 
trading can require growth in the volume of activity to spread the fixed costs of a new exchange.  In  
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the presence of an inadequate market scale or pronounced market failures, a commodity exchange is 
likely to fail. Such failures can impose long-run costs on society, as resources will have been drawn 
away from productive uses and traders will be disillusioned (Leuthold 1994). In some cases, 
governments can intervene to create conditions that support the development of a commodity 
exchange, but deficiencies may be structural and thus beyond the influence of government in the short 
term.   
5 
3.  CONDITIONS ENABLING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A  
COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
A functional commodity exchange must attract a sufficient volume of trade to enable the benefits of 
lowered costs of search, screen, and price discovery to emerge while simultaneously spreading the 
costs of its services over a sufficient base of users. One can identify three broad categories of 
conditions that enable robust commodities exchange development. First, the commodities to be traded 
on the exchange must have certain physical and market features. Without such standardized 
commodities, an exchange can quickly become irrelevant. Second, given appropriate commodities, the 
contracts traded in the exchange must be suited to the economic conditions. Failure to correctly 
specify contracts will make an exchange unattractive to potential users. Finally, given appropriate 
commodity and contract features, an exchange needs to be supported by a facilitating market and a 
supportive market and policy environment.    
3.1. Commodity Specific Conditions  
3.1.1. Continuously Produced or Storable Commodities 
A contract can only be traded on a commodity exchange if both buyers and sellers are reasonably 
certain about the availability of the specified commodity at a particular date and location. Early futures 
markets developed exclusively for storable commodities such as cereals, coffee, cotton, and metals. 
With advancements in refrigeration, many commodities such as orange juice concentrate and pork 
bellies that were previously un-storable are now able to be traded in futures exchanges. Perishable 
goods that are continuously produced may also be traded regardless of their storability. Continuously 
produced commodities can be traded in a futures market provided sufficient information is available to 
ensure market transparency (Black 1986). New production technologies have tended to expand the 
production seasons for many products, allowing more scope for futures trade.   
Since most discussion of exchanges in Africa focuses on cereals, the need for continuous 
availability means that countries need to assess warehouse capacity. One indicator of the feasibility of 
establishing an exchange is therefore the cost of improving warehouse capacity to a minimum 
standard.  Information regarding the time required to establish a warehouse in various countries is 
presented in Table 1. Comparison of these numbers with OECD countries, which require 14 
procedures and 150 days to complete a warehouse, suggests that establishing warehouses is not 
particularly difficult in the African context. However, given weak physical infrastructure, connecting 
warehouses to each other and to central collection points might prove challenging. Increased 
warehouse capacity could become costly even when per unit costs are reasonable if the scale of 
deficiencies is large. While some African countries report underused capacity in warehousing, much of 
the existing warehouse capacity may be situated according to the priorities of defunct parastatal 
marketing boards, which could be inconsistent with the needs of a market-based system. 
    
6 
Table 1. Procedures and time to construct warehouse and start businesses 
Countries 
Constructing Warehouses  Starting a Business 
Number of Procedures  
Time  
(number of days)  Number of Procedures  
Time  
(number of days) 
Ethiopia  12.0  128.0  6.7  20.2 
Ghana  18.0  220.0  10.7  59.3 
Kenya  10.0  137.2  12.3  43.8 
Malawi  21.0  213.0  10.0  37.7 
Nigeria  19.6  370.8  8.8  37.7 
Zambia  17.0  254.0  6.0  29.0 
India  37.0  195.0  12.0  48.0 
OECD  15.0  162.0  6.1  16.0 
Source: www.DoingBusiness.org. 
Note: The numbers are averages of 2005-10 reports. 
3.1.2. Product Homogeneity within a System of Grades and Standards  
Samples of the same commodity can differ in terms of moisture content, impurities, safety standards, 
and many other features. For a commodity to be tradable in a futures market, it must be subject to 
grades and standards that account for relevant attributes. With workable standards, futures contracts 
can identify specific characteristics and allow for standardized discounts when contract specifications 
are not met at delivery.  Many African countries have grades and standards for major export 
commodities, as well as functioning auction markets for these commodities. For cereals, formal grades 
and standards are less common, and countries may need to develop or improve their systems of grades 
and standards before setting up cereal exchanges. In this regard, South Africa sets an example with the 
most developed system of grades and standards for cereals and by far the most active exchange in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
3.1.3. Large and Active Spot Market 
A commodity is only likely to be traded effectively on an exchange if a large spot market, in terms of 
value and number of market participants, already exists. More value in the existing market implies 
more interest by participants, which increases the likelihood of successful trade in any kind of contract 
and the likely added value of the centralized exchange. Moreover, a large volume of trade is needed to 
generate sufficient commissions to cover the costs of running the commodities exchange. A large 
number of market participants also reduces the probability of collusion and market manipulation, 
increasing the expected value of the exchange. Finally, an active spot market provides information 
about traders’ preferences and priorities which can be used to craft contracts and inform bids in the 
exchange.  
The existing literature does not identify a minimum volume or scale of economic activity 
required for a commodity exchange to succeed. However, the low level of agricultural value added in 
most African countries compared with countries with active exchanges suggests that the scale of trade 
in Africa is likely to be an issue. In 2005, agricultural value added in India and South Africa, where 
exchanges are active, was US$145.8 and US$7.3 billion, respectively.  By comparison, for the 45 
countries for which data are available, the value of agricultural GDP is less than a US$1 billion in 27 
countries (60 percent), between $1–2 billion in 8 countries, between $2–4 billion in 5 countries, and 
only over $4 billion in the remaining five countries.   
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Even in countries in which total agricultural value added is high (for example, Ethiopia), the 
value of marketed production, which is critical for a commodities exchange, may be low and poorly 
documented. Export and import values can be used to indicate the volume of market activity. Table 2 
presents data on agricultural trade for African countries that have initiated commodity exchanges.
2
Table 2. Indicators of agricultural market sizes in selected African countries in 2005 
  It 
is clear that South Africa’s sector is far larger than that of the other countries.  The leading agricultural 
commodity exchange had an annual value of under US$300 million in most countries and only 
exceeded $500 million in South Africa. Moreover, South Africa’s largest export commodity by value 
had an export share of only 16 percent, reflecting the presence of many other commodities of similar 
scale. In contrast, most other African countries rely on one or two dominant commodities.  
Indicators  Ethiopia  Kenya  Malawi  Uganda  Zambia 
South 
Africa 
Total agricultural exports (Million US$)  380  1296  392  359  202  3421 
Share of leading export commodities (%)  51  35  66  34  38  16 
Value of leading export commodity 
(Million US$)   198  454  258  122  76  535 
Value of agricultural imports (Million 
US$)  422  483  58  281  97.2  2650 
Share of leading import commodities (%)  43  17.7  20  26  24  7.6 
Value of leading import commodities 
(Million US$)  181  87  12  73  23  201 
Source: FAOStat of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 
South Africa’s exchange (SAFEX) provides an indication of the level of trade in a successful 
market. SAFEX regularly trades over 100,000 futures contracts in white maize monthly. On April 20, 
2007 (a normal day), the value of trade for white maize with a May delivery reached US$8.5 million, 
and the value of all contracts in white maize was valued at over $85.2 million. The value of the 
contracts in all commodities traded on April 20, 2007 was worth $125 million.
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While a single day of trade activity in South Africa is valued at over US$100 million, 
ZAMACE reported a total of US$18.3 million in traded value between October 2007 and April 2010. 
Similarly, between April and December 2008, ECX traded only 935 tons of maize, 90 tons of wheat, 
and 570 tons of beans, with a total value of $794,000. By comparison, South Africa’s SAFEX traded 
600,000 tons of maize in the month of July 2010 alone. At a commission rate of 0.2 percent, the ECX 
generated gross revenue of $1,588 in its first nine months, amounting to $144 per month. Unable to 
make ECX viable through trade in primary cereals, the government of Ethiopia suspended the active 
coffee auction floor and directed traders to use the new exchange starting in January 2009. When 
coffee traders declined to export through ECX, the government confiscated stocks and channeled them 
through the exchange. These developments reflect the difficulties small economies may have in trying 
to use centralized commodities exchanges to reduce transactions costs. 
  
                                                       
2 See Table 2 in the Appendix for further details on trade volumes and concentration. 
3 Data from SAFEX statement of daily trading volume statistics can be found at the following website: 
http://www.safex.co.za/ap/market_data_volume_stats.asp.    
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3.1.4. Variable Spot Market Prices 
Since one purpose of a futures market is to manage price risk, cash market price instability is a basic 
requirement for a commodity futures exchange. Where prices are regulated or markets are 
monopolistic, futures contracts are unlikely to attract buyers. Regulated cash markets made 
commodities exchanges irrelevant in most African countries for most major commodities during much 
of the post-colonial period. Price variability in Africa’s grains markets has increased following 
liberalization, but variability that does not emerge from well-functioning competitive markets may not 
support an exchange. Prices can vary significantly across space due to inadequate infrastructure or 
information asymmetry, both of which are important sources of market failures. Erratic price behavior 
that is inconsistent with observable transaction costs could undermine a commodity exchange by 
making basis risk unacceptably high and complicating efforts to craft acceptable contracts. Given 
competitive but high cost cash markets, an effective price information system to support more 
predictable price relationships in the cash markets could be required before a commodities exchange 
can thrive. 
Contract-Specific Conditions 
An exchange can only operate if it offers contracts that are attractive to market participants.  Even in 
developed countries with mature commodity exchanges, most futures contracts fail because they do 
not attract sufficient market participants.  For instance, in the US from 1975 to the early 1990s, only 
about one-third of more than 340 contracts approved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
succeeded (Garcia and Leuthold 2004). A well-established exchange with a core of widely traded 
contracts can absorb unsuccessful ones. However, if a nascent exchange fails to offer attractive 
contracts, it is unlikely to continue to operate.  
3.2.1. Attracting Market Participants 
Viable futures contracts must be attractive to brokers, hedgers, and speculators in order to draw 
adequate volume.
4
1.  A close relationship of contract terms with cash market trade 
 A large spot market generally means a sufficient number of brokers, hedgers, and 
speculators, but contract features can either discourage or encourage participation. Each of these types 
of traders is useful in creating sufficient activity to support a commodities exchange. Three contract 
features are key:  
2.  Small basis risks 
3.  Appropriate contract size 
If a futures contract does not have a clear analogue in the cash market, the basis will be 
difficult to calculate and a futures contract will lose value for hedging. Therefore, the futures contract 
should be defined consistently with the spot market.  Moreover, factors that affect the basis and its 
variability must be considered when specifying the contract. If interest rates, warehousing costs, and 
transportation costs are unpredictable, it may be difficult to specify a contract that will attract both 
buyers and sellers. Finally, the size and quality of standardized contracts must be appropriate for 
traders, making it fungible and usable as collateral in the banking system. Even if the contract is not 
integrated into the financial markets directly, its size and specifications must be consistent with the 
capacities and objectives of the traders.  
                                                       
4 Warehouse receipts will be of interest to brokers but not speculators since they are not interested in accepting delivery 
risk.  Markets for warehouse receipts will tend to be less liquid than those for futures contracts.  
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3.2.2. Preventing Manipulations and Balancing Interests 
For a futures contract to be successful, it must not favor some market participants over others. Gray 
(1966) concluded that contracts that favored either buyers or sellers, enabling one side to squeeze the 
other, either failed or had to be revised to make them successful. Constraints to developing balanced 
contracts for African markets that are attractive to potential users are not well understood. In general, 
contracts that allow more flexibility by specifying premiums or discounts based on quality, location, 
and other factors assist in balancing interests and preventing manipulations. Specifying appropriate 
discounts is only possible with reference to information from reliable cash markets with consistent 
transactions costs. Empirical studies in the US markets by Black (1986) and Bronsen and Fofana 
(2001) found that an active cash market is the primary condition for the success of a new contract. An 
active market facilitates the definition of contract terms that are balanced and provides clear 
assessment of basis risk.  
Bollman, Garcia, and Thompson (2003) provide a rare detailed case study of the collapse of a 
specific contract. Their analysis of the di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) futures contract in the Chicago 
Board of Trade indicated that the contract ultimately failed because the cash and futures markets were 
not sufficiently well linked, making it a poor hedging tool that offered no additional risk management 
support. This case study demonstrates the difficulty of providing a functional, balanced contract even 
when the infrastructural, macroeconomic, and institutional environment is hospitable. In the absence 
of active cash markets and reliable information regarding those markets, it may be difficult to develop 
an attractive contract to trade on an African commodity exchange.  
Economic and Policy Environment 
Commodity exchanges have historically developed under private initiatives, but they require 
supportive public policies. The main benefits of an exchange can be achieved only if a country has 
adequate infrastructure, efficient flow of information, a sound macroeconomic and financial 
environment, stable rule of law, and effective contract enforcement. Additionally, public policy must 
support commodity exchange development by refraining from controlling commodity markets and by 
allowing producer organizations and other entities to emerge as intermediaries between farmers and 
exchanges. 
3.3.1. Physical Infrastructure 
Communications and transportation infrastructure is critical to a functioning exchange. First, trade at a 
futures exchange requires a communications network that can provide traders with spot market 
information in order to estimate the basis. A commodity exchange also needs to be supported by a 
reliable system for transportation and distribution, so that delivery location can be credibly specified in 
the contract. Moreover, transaction costs must be stable enough for traders to evaluate the spread 
between the spot and futures contract prices.   
Infrastructure must not only support the exchange, but it must also link various spot markets if 
the exchange is to function successfully. Ideally, the physical and communications infrastructure will 
ensure information regarding product quality, quantity, form, and price in all relevant markets is 
available across various spot markets. In the absence of this information, price discovery in the spot 
markets may be erratic and price risk will not be manageable in a futures exchange. Available data 
suggest that the lack of physical infrastructure may be a constraining factor in many African countries. 
Countries with successful exchanges have far more developed communications and/or transportation 
infrastructure than countries with less successful exchanges (Table 3). Public investment in both 
transportation and information infrastructure may be needed for the development of a successful 
commodity exchange in countries where such infrastructure does not currently exist.  
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Table 3. Indicators of communications and transportation infrastructure 
Countries 
Road density  
(km/km sq land area) 
Percent of  
paved roads 
Ground line & Mobile phone 
subscribers per 1,000 people 
Internet users 
per 1000 people 
Ethiopia   0.03  13  8  2 
Ghana   0.21  18  93  17 
Kenya   0.11  12  85  45 
Malawi   0.3  19  25  3 
Nigeria   0.21  31  79  14 
Zambia   0.12  22  34  20 
Uganda  0.35  13  44  8 
South Africa   0.3  20  473  78 
India   1.29  63  85  32 
Source: Compiled from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank.   
Note: Data are for 2006 or later years.  
3.3.2. Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure 
A commodity exchange must be supported by appropriate legal infrastructure, particularly  
1.   a system of grades and standards,  
2.   a credible system of contract enforcement, and  
3.  governance in spot markets.  
In most African cereals markets, a system of grades and standards is not likely to evolve 
without government involvement.  However, the real challenge in African markets will not be the 
development of grades but the enforcement of contracts that use those goods. The legal system must 
ensure contract enforcement and a regulatory system must ensure that warehouses do not issue 
multiple receipts for a single lot. For futures contracts, participants must have confidence that 
contracts will be recognized by the legal system and that contract obligations will be enforced.  
Information on enforcing contracts in selected countries is presented in Table 4. India and the 
OECD are included here for comparison with conditions in African countries. These data reveal wide 
variations in conditions across African countries as compared with OECD countries, where contract 
enforcement requires an average of 22 procedures over 351 days, costing 11.2 percent of the debt to be 
recovered.  In terms of the number of procedures, most African countries in the sample are similar to 
the OECD. Malawi stands out as having a high number of procedures, but it is not as high as India. 
South Africa, India, Ethiopia, and Ghana stand out for the length of time resolution requires. As for 
total cost, however, South Africa is quite low, almost at the OECD average. Ghana also has relatively 
low costs, while costs in Malawi appear to make efforts at contract enforcement futile. The wide 
dispersion of costs among African countries and the favorable comparison of many of them with India, 
where exchanges are successfully functioning, suggest that some African countries may have 
enforcement abilities that are sufficient to support an exchange. In this respect, the comparison of 
Ethiopia and South Africa is encouraging for the new exchange in Ethiopia.   
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Table 4. Indicators of contract enforcement capacity 
Countries 
Indicators 
Number of procedures  Days to process  Cost as a percent of debt recovered 
Ethiopia  30  690  14.8 
Ghana  22  730  12.7 
Kenya  25  360  41.3 
Malawi  40  337  136.5 
Zambia  21  404  28.7 
Uganda  19  484  35.2 
South Africa  26  600  11.5 
India  56  1,420  35.7 
OECD countries  22  351  11.20 
Source: DoingBusiness.org. 
Note: Data are for 2007 or most recent years. 
3.3.3. Macroeconomic Stability 
A commodity exchange, particularly a futures trade, cannot develop and be sustained in the absence of 
sound policies for monetary management and foreign trade. In particular, macroeconomic policy needs 
to maintain stable and reasonably undistorted real interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation rates. 
Hyperinflation and dramatic macroeconomic failures made Zimbabwe’s exchange untenable. 
Ethiopia’s experience demonstrates the more subtle role of macroeconomic policies on a commodity 
exchange. Once the government of Ethiopia dismantled the coffee auction floor and required 
Ethiopian coffee to be exported through the ECX, traders opted to hold the commodity rather than sell 
it. One explanation for this behavior is that the Ethiopian Birr was highly overvalued and a 
devaluation of 20–30 percent was rumored to be eminent. Under the circumstances, holding stocks 
until after the anticipated devaluation was economically rational; however, similar behavior among 
other exporters may have depressed exports broadly, exacerbating a balance-of-payment crisis. The 
exchange crisis, a product of macroeconomic policy, likely contributed to the government’s decision 
to confiscate 17,000 tons of coffee from 80 exporters and channel it through the ECX.
5
3.3.4. Commercial and Financial Sectors Development 
 State coercion was 
apparently needed to overcome the constraints on the exchange implied by a small market size and macro 
policy distortions. In any case, the Ethiopian experience demonstrates the relevance of a sound 
macroeconomic environment and stable exchange rates in developing and sustaining an exchange.  
A commodity exchange relies on a developed financial system.  For an exchange to operate 
successfully, there must be an adequate number of potential hedgers and speculators in the economy. 
These individuals must understand risk-taking and trading and must have financial capacity. 
Moreover, the exchange itself must have access to a clearinghouse with sufficient capital to serve as a 
guarantor of all transactions. These requirements imply a generally well-functioning financial sector. 
Available indicators suggest that financial sectors in most countries in Africa are either 
shallow or constrained by repressive regulations. Table 5 presents indicators for the same set of 
countries examined in Table 4.  Low or negative real interest rates indicate repressed financial systems 
in all countries except South Africa and India. Furthermore, South Africa and India have considerably 
                                                       
5 The story was reported by BBC and is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7964146.stm   
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lower spreads between deposit and lending rates, suggesting more efficient and liquid financial 
markets. The stock of credit in these economies is consistent with the real interest rate data, with low 
volumes of domestic credit relative to GDP in countries with repressed interest rates. Under these 
circumstances, it is likely to be difficult to finance the activities of an exchange. 
Table 5. Indicators of financial market development 
Indicators  Ethiopia  Ghana  Kenya  Malawi  Nigeria  Zambia 
South 
Africa  India 
Real interest 
rate deposits 
(%)  -8.1  - 4.3  -4.74  -3.89  -2.62  -6.03  2.56   
Real interest 
rate lending 
(%)  -4.6  --  2.33  15.31  3.91  8.35  6.99  6.24 
Real interest 
rate spread 




index  --  --  3.5  --  1.0  1.5  6.0  5.5 
Net 
Domestic 
Credit  (% 





sector (% of 




sector (% of 





(CPI))  11.60  15.12  10.31  15.41  13.51  18.32  3.4  4.25 
Source: Data derived from World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.  
Note:  All indicators are based on 2007 or later years.   
Real interest rates are calculated using the consumer price index.  Financial information infrastructure index is based on 10 
factors, of which 6 cover the scope, quality, and availability of credit reporting data (in private and public registries) and the 
existence of a basic legal framework for credit reporting. The other 4 factors cover the availability of public registry data for 
collateral (fixed and moveable) and corporate registries and court records. The index is from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating greater financial infrastructure. 
A final measure of the strength and development of the financial sector is the financial 
information infrastructure index, which reflects the scope, quality, and availability of credit reporting, 
the legal framework for reporting, and the availability of relevant court records and registries. This 
index is scaled from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the maximum availability of financial information.  
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Table 5 reveals that countries with functioning exchanges have a far greater financial information 
infrastructure than those with failed exchanges. In terms of financial information infrastructure, 
conditions in Ethiopia appear inhospitable to the new exchange. 
3.3.5. Political Tolerance to Cereal Price Movements 
Because they dominate agricultural production in most African countries, cereal crops are the likely 
target for commodity exchanges in the region.  At the same time, food crops are inevitably a 
politically sensitive topic in low income countries and are susceptible to unpredictable policy 
intervention. The likelihood of intervention adds another layer of risk which can limit the success of 
an exchange and its contracts. 
Most African countries have intervened in cereal markets to stabilize prices, especially when 
sudden price spikes have threatened consumer welfare.  Even before the food price spikes of 2007 and 
2008, food price shocks had stimulated controls that undermined commodity exchanges in Africa. 
Zambia successfully launched a commodity exchange in the mid-1990s, following agricultural market 
liberalization; however, faced with what it considered to be intolerable food price increases in the late 
1990s, the Zambian government intervened in maize markets, rendering the exchange superfluous 
(UNCTAD 2007). Given the political sensitivity of food prices, other developing countries, including 
India and Indonesia, exclude important cereals from their commodity exchanges. 
Commodity exchanges cannot guarantee that prices will remain within the range that is 
politically acceptable. Analyses of historical data suggest that futures prices are slightly less variable 
than spot prices (Tomek and Gray 1970). Extending this idea further, Gilbert (1996) argues that 
although commodity futures can help market participants and the producing governments to manage 
risks associated with variability over an annual time horizon, this should not be equated with price 
stabilization. If prices spike, governments will tend to intervene; if the intervention is large, it can 
shatter confidence in the market-based system and reduce the likelihood of a successful exchange.    
3.3.6. Farm Size and Production Organizations 
In most African countries, agriculture is dominated by smallholders. Jayne et al (2006) report that 
median farm sizes are less than two hectares in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia. 
It is well recognized that smallholders do not access commodity futures markets directly. They may 
lack know-how, have insufficient collateral for margins, and have difficulty monitoring prices (Larson 
et al. 1998). Even large-scale producers in the US rarely use futures contracts directly. Surveys 
commonly indicate that only 5–10 percent of US producers use futures contracts. Nonetheless, US 
farmers benefit from futures trading because they sell to local elevator operators who offer pricing 
contracts that are based on futures contracts and their prices. In turn, the purchasers take positions in 
futures to manage their operations. 
In most African countries, additional institutional mechanisms are needed to link smallholders 
to centralized exchanges. Producers’ organizations could be used to complete product assembly and 
conduct transactions. Such organizations would also have an important role in communicating grades 
and standards which must be met. In the absence of such institutional innovations, a centralized 
agricultural commodity exchange is not likely to develop in a smallholder-dominated country and is 
unlikely to serve smallholders if it does develop in an African context. 
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4.  ALTERNATIVES TO DOMESTIC COMMODITY EXCHANGES  
Many African markets may lack sufficient market size and supportive policy and infrastructural 
environments to support domestic commodity exchanges in the near future. Given feasibility and cost, 
African countries may seek to rely on existing exchanges in other countries or to coordinate with 
neighbors to establish regional exchanges.  
4.1. Use of Offshore Commodity Exchanges  
If establishing a domestic commodity exchange is questionable, offshore exchanges can provide some 
benefits. A well-established offshore exchange may provide hedging opportunities, high liquidity, and 
better integration with world markets. Use of an offshore commodity exchange implies risks of 
exchange rate movements which can alter local currency prices aside from movement in commodity 
prices.  This risk can be mitigated by trading and hedging in foreign currency.  
The second risk associated with use of an offshore exchange is added basis risk. Offshore 
traders face a potentially large basis risk when there is a long distance to the delivery location in the 
contract. The basis may be volatile when the product is graded domestically using different 
specifications from those used in the exchange. In this case, deliveries are likely to be subject to 
unanticipated discounts due to quality characteristics. Basis risk will also be large if the local spot 
markets are subject to price fluctuations that are not transmitted to or from the offshore exchange. For 
cereal crops in Africa, the basis risks associated with use of an offshore exchange are likely to be 
prohibitive because local prices vary widely with local conditions and because local varieties and 
grades differ from those used abroad.
6
Aside from basis risk and exchange rate risk, use of offshore exchanges could be limited by 
contract specifications in terms of size or other features that are not appropriate for the local context. 
If, for example, minimum contract sizes were beyond the capacity of local institutions, an offshore 
exchange would not serve most potential participants. Similarly, offshore exchanges may not be 
accessible because brokers in those exchanges may be reluctant to work with new (risky) clients from 
developing countries (Morgan 2001). A solution to these problems, suggested by Mohan (2007), could 
involve established exchanges integrating producer countries by establishing branch exchanges trading 
in commodities that are also traded at the central exchange.  
   
The problems associated with basis risk are less likely to emerge for an African country’s 
export commodities than for cereals. Since domestic consumption of export commodities like cocoa 
and coffee is low, the domestic conditions reflect international markets. Moreover, systems of grades 
and standards used in international exchanges for these tropical commodities reflect the varieties and 
qualities produced in Africa. For export crops, Mohan (2007) provides estimates of the low costs to 
using offshore exchanges for coffee. Indeed, for tropical commodities that are already traded on 
existing exchanges, domestic exchanges may be unable to draw participants who have the option to 
use an established offshore exchange. The presence of an accessible offshore exchange may make a 
domestic exchange redundant and non-viable. 
4.2. Development of Regional Commodity Exchanges  
Offshore exchanges may be useful for Africa’s export commodities, but they are unlikely to serve 
cereal crops.  Meanwhile, the development of domestic exchanges for these commodities will often be 
inhibited by the size of the markets and by unsupportive policies and regulatory environments. 
Deficiencies in physical infrastructure are also substantial but can be corrected with public investments 
                                                       
6 Local price fluctuations can be large in African countries with liberalized trade regimes because high transportation 
costs imply a very wide disparity between import and export prices.  
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that are justified on multiple other grounds. An alternative to an offshore exchange would be the 
creation of common markets among several countries, which would increase market size while 
imposing regulatory consistency and thus make commodity exchanges more likely to succeed. Within 
a common market, a commodity exchange would also enjoy increased access to cereals grown in a 
wider climatic range, extending the harvest period and smoothing prices.  In order to support a 
regional exchange, countries would have to harmonize trade and exchange rate policies, set up 
agreeable rules for grades and standards and for contract enforcement, and promote regional 
macroeconomic stability. In the absence of such enabling policies and enforceable rules, a sustainable 
regional commodity exchange is not likely to develop.  
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5.  SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Following market liberalization, the establishment of commodity exchanges has been considered to be 
a potential market-based mechanism for commodity price risk management. While such initiatives 
have been successful in some emerging countries, they have frequently failed or had limited success in 
Africa. This paper reviews the purpose of, conditions for, and challenges to establishing commodity 
exchanges in Africa. Despite their potential usefulness, commodity exchanges’ success in Africa 
depends on conditions which are absent in many African contexts. As summarized in Table 6, for 
African economies the binding constraints to successful commodity exchanges appear to be small 
market size, compounded by weak infrastructure and underdeveloped financial sectors, as well as a 
lack of supportive legal and regulatory frameworks.    
Table 6. Key enabling conditions, their prevalence, and government policy in Africa 
Enabling Condition for  
Commodity Exchange 
Prevalence of Condition in  
African Economies 
Government policy influences in 
changing the conditions in the  
Short Run 
Sufficient market scale and activity   For primary cereal crop and 
dominant export crop only 
Very limited 
 
Absence of contracts for same 
commodity in offshore exchange  
(non-redundancy) 
 





Freedom of cash market from political 
interference 
 
Cannot be usually assured for 
primary cereal crop 
 
Limited, given political sensitivity of food 
prices 
 




Can be affected through investment in 
infrastructure and appropriate regulation 
 
Credible contract enforcement , useful 





Potentially high, with credible governance 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Evidence in the literature clearly indicates that the risks of failure are very high if an exchange 
is launched in a thin market. While a critical minimum is not clearly defined, market sizes in most 
African countries appear to be small compared with the countries that have active commodity 
exchanges. Under-developed financial markets may also make it difficult for hedgers and speculators 
to actively participate in these exchanges. Within African countries, cereal crops have the largest 
markets; however, cereal prices remain politically sensitive and are likely targets for government 
control or other interventions, especially during periods of rapid food price inflation. Commodities 
that are likely to draw a sufficient scale of trade to ensure needed liquidity in a commodity exchange 
are likely to be the very goods that are subject to political interference or that can be traded effectively 
on existing exchanges abroad.  Even when a government is committed to allowing an exchange to 
function without price controls or interference, a track record of policy reversals and scape-goating 
private traders for market abnormalities could still inhibit an exchange.  
The development of regional exchanges could offer price risk management tools for cereal 
crops but will require a long-term commitment and is dependent on successful regional integration. A  
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common market could provide the necessary ingredients for a successful exchange (increased volume, 
more market participants, higher liquidity, uniform grades and standards, and lower basis risks), but 
Africa’s record in regional integration is mixed. Recent successes in Common Markets for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) offer some hope.   
A basic condition for a commodity exchange is a smoothly functioning cash market that can 
be used to estimate the basis when making trades and can also be used to set the specifics of contracts.  
Development and improvement of cash markets thus serves commodity exchanges. The enabling 
conditions for development of commodity exchanges are also fundamental to market development. 
Good physical infrastructure reduces transaction costs and promotes trade; a successful market 
information system can address information asymmetry; establishing warehouse receipts can mitigate 
liquidity constraints for farmers and traders; well-designed farmers’ organizations can facilitate 
product aggregation and smallholders’ linkage to the market. These investments are now increasingly 
feasible and could generate large social benefits, irrespective of whether they are part of the 
establishment of commodity exchanges.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1. Share of three leading commodities in total exports in low income countries 
Country    Average 1990- 1992  Average 1997- 1999  Average 1990-1999  Three leading commodities in 1997-1999   
African Countries (27)  Percentage    
 Botswana    78.80  73.20  94.59   Diamonds sorted, bovine meat, hides and skins   
 Niger    95.70  93.70  94.00   Uranium, live animals, tobacco   
 Gabon    93.17  93.22  91.81   Fuels, wood non-coniferous, manganese ore   
 Congo    94.49  85.83  91.17   Fuels, wood non-coniferous, sugar, total   
 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
(ex Zaire)    86.60  86.25  88.88   Diamonds sorted, coffee green roast, wood non-coniferous   
 Nigeria    94.98  78.16  86.94   Fuels, cocoa + products, natural rubber   
 Comoros    94.43  65.48  86.75   Vanilla, essential oils nes, cloves, whole+stems   
 Burundi    86.32  88.91  86.57   Coffee green+roast, tea, sugar, total   
 Equatorial Guinea    62.46  89.06  83.88   Fuels, wood non-coniferous, cocoa + products   
 Guinea-Bissau    81.60  75.24  81.96   Nuts, fishery commodities, cotton lint   
 Sao Tome and Principe    78.49  92.11  81.32   Cocoa + products, fishery commodities, coffee green+roast   
 Ethiopia       79.42  80.28   Coffee green+roast, hides and skins, sesame seed   
 Angola    96.26  71.00  79.88   Fuels, diamonds sorted, coffee green+roast   
 Malawi    86.50  70.96  76.52   Tobacco, tea, sugar,total   
 Central African Republic    64.52  73.15  70.00   Diamonds sorted, wood non-coniferous, cotton lint   
 Uganda    65.76  65.94  68.37   Coffee green+roast, fishery commodities, crude materials (incl. Flowers)   
 Zambia    77.22  49.61  67.83   Refined copper, sugar, total, cotton lint   
 Togo    66.10  61.75  65.69   Nat. Ca phosphate, cotton lint, coffee green+roast   
 Rwanda    85.60  69.62  64.99   Coffee green+roast, tea, hides and skins   
 Cameroon    74.27  44.10  62.15   Fuels, wood non-coniferous, cocoa + products   
 Chad    68.04  52.44  61.64   Cotton lint, live animals, crude materials (incl. flowers)   
 Guinea    61.64  59.92  61.59   Bauxite, alumina (al oxide, hydroxide), fishery commodities   
 Ghana    69.18  61.88  60.83   Cocoa + products, diamonds sorted, gold (unwrought non monetary)   
 Mali    73.28  45.13  58.15   Cotton lint, live animals, oil of groundnuts   
 Côte d'Ivoire    50.66  60.00  55.99   Cocoa + products, fuels , coffee green roast   
 Somalia    56.11  41.20  50.88   Live animals, bananas, fishery commodities   
 Namibia    28.68  72.06  50.87   Diamonds sorted, fishery commodities, live animals   
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD 2003 Commodity Yearbook based on World Bank classification of low income countries. 
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Table A.2. Commodity dependence in international trade for six African countries 
Countries/Item  1979-81  1989-91  2000-04 
Ethiopia       
Total export (MLN US$)  290  312  506 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  270  279  332 
Total import (MLN US$)  403  834  1852 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  49  208  323 
Percent share of major exports in agriculture (coffee, sesame seed, hides and 
skins, dry-slated sheep) 
71  77  66 
Percent share of major imports in agriculture (wheat, vegetable oil, maize 
flour) 
33  42  62 
Kenya       
Total export (MLN US$)  1237  1089  2173 
Agricultural export (MLN  US$)  668  666  1044 
Total import (MLN US$)  2106  2113  3705 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  153  191  472 
Percent share of major exports in agriculture (tea, crude organic material, 
coffee)  72  76  72 
Percent share of major imports  in agriculture (palm oil, wheat, rice)  34  58  47 
Malawi        
Total export (MLN US$)  260  387  450 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  232  362  410 
Total import (MLN US$)  396  597  677 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  33  78  66 
Percent share of major exports in agriculture (tobacco leaves, sugar, tea)  84  91  90 
Percent share of major imports  in agriculture (wheat flour, food 
preparations, maize flour) 
9  14  20 
South Africa        
Total export (MLN US$)  21581  23084  34143 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  2157  1904  2629 
Total import (MLN US$)  16029  17194  35182 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  752  990  1755 
Percent share of major exports in agriculture (wine, oranges, grapes)  8  9  26 
Percent share of major imports  in agriculture (rice, wheat, oil of palm) 
11  14  17 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Uganda         
Total export (MLN US$)  344  228  563 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  341  207  226 
Total import (MLN US$)  322  611  1497 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  36  31  171 
Percent  share of major exports in agriculture (coffee, cotton, tobacco leaves)  98  85  54 
Percent  share of major imports  in agriculture (wheat, oil of palm, maize) 
13  17  39 
Zambia          
Total export (MLN US$)  1249  1338  1145 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  9  24  123 
Total import (MLN US$)  974  909  1174 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  102  47  114 
Percent  share of major exports in agriculture (cotton, sugar, tobacco)  81  31  54 
Percent  share of major imports  in agriculture (maize, oil of palm, wheat) 
59  40  27 
Zimbabwe        
Total export (MLN US$)  1293  1630  2592 
Agricultural export (MLN US$)  487  670  833 
Total import (MLN US$)  1182  1882  1809 
Agricultural import (MLN US$)  40  56  233 
Percent  share of major exports in agriculture (tobacco leaves, cotton, sugar)  70  73  84 
Percent  share of major imports  in agriculture (maize, flour of maize, 
tobacco leaves) 
25  6  32 
Source: World Development Indicator (WDI).  
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